In beslissing T 2360/19 heeft de Kamer van Beroep de herroeping vernietigd van een Europees octrooi betreffende CRISPR-Cas9-technologie voor toepassing in eukaryote cellen. Centraal stond de vraag of de octrooihouder zich rechtsgeldig op het voorrangsrecht kon beroepen dat was gebaseerd op Amerikaanse voorlopige octrooiaanvragen, terwijl een van de oorspronkelijke uitvinders (en diens werkgever) niet als aanvrager was vermeld in de daaropvolgende PCT-aanvraag. Onder verwijzing naar de recente beslissing G 1/22 van de Grote Kamer van Beroep oordeelde de Kamer dat het voorrangsrecht rechtsgeldig was ingeroepen, uitgaande van het vermoeden dat een overdracht van het voorrangsrecht had plaatsgevonden. Lees het volledige artikel hieronder verder in het Engels.
The patent proprietors appealed against the opposition division's decision to revoke European patent no. 2 784 162 relating to CRISPR-Cas9 technology. The patent claimed priority from twelve US provisional applications (P1-P12). The opposition division found that the priority claims from four of these documents (P1, P2, P5, and P11) were invalid because not all original applicants were named on the subsequent application, applying the "all applicants approach." As a result, the patent was found to lack novelty over intervening prior art.
The key issue was that L. Marraffini, an employee of Rockefeller University, was named as an inventor-applicant on the four US provisional applications but was not named on the subsequent PCT application filed by the appellants (The Broad Institute, MIT, and Harvard). There had been an inventorship dispute between Marraffini/Rockefeller University and the appellants, which was later settled through binding arbitration in 2018. The arbitrator determined that Marraffini should not be named as an inventor, nor should Rockefeller University be named as a proprietor of the PCT application.
During the appeal proceedings, the Enlarged Board of Appeal issued decision G 1/22 on 10 October 2023, which fundamentally changed the EPO's approach to assessing priority claims. The Board applied this new framework to the present case.
According to G 1/22:
This presumption is based on the concept of an implicit agreement to transfer the priority right and can only be rebutted in "rare exceptional cases" with evidence that such an agreement did not exist.
The Board found that there was no evidence to rebut the presumption in this case. On the contrary, the settlement of the inventorship dispute supported the presumption of an implied transfer agreement. The Board reasoned that it was "not credible that Marraffini or the Rockefeller University would have acted in a way to invalidate the priority claim of a patent they were seeking to be named as inventor of, and owner of, respectively."
The Board rejected the opponents' arguments that the arbitration settlement was irrelevant to priority rights and that the presumption approach in G 1/22 should not apply retroactively. The Board emphasized that G 1/22 explicitly allows for retroactive transfers of priority rights and noted that "there is always a party who is entitled to claim priority."
The Board found that the patent was entitled to claim priority from all twelve US provisional applications, set aside the opposition division's decision, and remitted the case for further prosecution on other grounds of opposition.
The Board declined to refer questions to the Enlarged Board regarding the retroactive effect of G 1/22, noting that the questions had either already been answered by G 1/22 or were not relevant to this decision.
Summary written by the NLO EPO Case Law Team